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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a corporation; JELCO, INC.,
a corporation; and CENTRAL UTAH
WATER CO~SERVANCY DISTRICT,
a body corporate and politic,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 16208

STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC.,
a corporat~on,
Defendant-Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant.

BRIEF OF

NAT~RE

A?PELL~~T

Of THE CASE

This is an action for property loss
eruption of a fiberglass

t~e

a~d

damages

che~ical

tank.

DISPOSITION IN LOI<'ER COURT
This case
Novembe::::- of 1978.

~as

tr~ed

to a jury in October and

The Jury ret-.Jrned a Special Verdict finding
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plaintiffs, Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. and Jelco,
Inc., twenty percent (20\) negligent in contributing to the
loss complained of.

The jury further found plaintiff,

Central Utah Water Conservancy District, ten percent (10%)
negligent in causing the loss, and defendant, Structo-Lite
Engineering, Inc., seventy percent (70%) negligent in
causing the damages complained of.

The jury found damages

to plaintiffs, Jacobsen-Jelco, in the amount of 5370,987.11,
and to plaintiff, Central Utah Water Conservancy Cistrict,
in the amount of 551,003.66.

The lower court then entered

judgment for the plaintiffs in the proportionate percentages
as established by the comparative negligence interrogatory,
plus costs.
rELIEF SOUGHT OK APPEAL

Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court and an entry of judoment for defendant and
against plaintiffs, no cause of action.
STATE~E~T

At the
J!cobsen

ti~e

Cc~~~~~c!icn

JC:~~

FACTS

of the accident in question, plaintiff
Cc~re~y.

and plaintiff Jelco, Inc.
1n a

OF

\'E~~~re

f~r

Ir.c.

(~e~eir.efter

Jacobsen)

(here1nafter Jelco) were engaged

the

constrcctic~

cf tne Jordan

~ater

Purification Plant in Salt Lake County, State of tltah, under
a written contract w1th plaintiff Central Utah
v d n cy D 1 s t r i c t

( J-: E r e i :-.a f t e r

C c ;, 5 e r ·: c n c ~: [ 1 1

~

t r

1

~ater

Conser-

ct ) .
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As part of the construction, Jacobsen and Jelco entered
into a subcontract with defendant Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc. (hereinafter Structo-Lite), whereby Structo-Lite agreed
to sell and deliver for installation in the project, six
fiberglass chemical storage tanks to be built in accordance
with the plans and specifications of the prime contract
between Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District.
Defendant Structo-Lite constructed and delivered the
six tanks which were then installed in the prime project by
Jacobsen.

Following the installation and completion of

project construction, the tanks were filled with chemical
solutions.

Thereafter, one of the tanks containing an alum

solution erupted and exploded, discharging the solution
throughout the building which housed said tanks and causing
extensive damage to the building, contents and
housed

e~uipment

th~rein.

Plaintiffs then brought this action alleging that
defendant had caused the damaqe complained of through its
negligent construction of the tanks; furthermore, that
the tanks

wer~

not built in accordnnce with the agreed

upon specifications in breach of the contract itself and
warra~ties

connected to the contract.

The case was tried to a jury which was in:tructed in
standard coreparative negligence concepts and also as to the
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doctrine of assumption of the risk.

The instructions on

assumption of the risk read as follow:

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
There is a legal principle commonly referred
to by the term •assumption of risk", which is as
follows:
A company is said to assume risk when it
voluntarily manifests its assent to the creation
or maintenance of a dangerous condition and
voluntarily exposes itself to that danger, or
when it knows that a danQer exists in either the
condition, use, or operation of property, and
voluntarily accepts the dangerous condition and
uses the dangerous product.
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
Distinction should be noted between the assumption of risk just described and the ordinary
and necessary acceptance of common risk such as
surround us all and that lie in the possibility
that other persons will not perform their duties
toward us.
As to this latter kind of every day
risk, a company will not be barred from recovery
by the fact, if it be a fact, that while it is
exercisins ordinary care, and when the"e is nothing
in the circumstances that either cautions it, or
would caution a reasonably prudent person in like
position to the contrary, it assumes that others
will perform their duties of due care toward it
and act on that assumption.
A Special Verdict was then submitted to the jurors.
In the answer to Special Interrogatory No. VIII,

the jurors

apportioned the comparative negligence of the parties as
follows:
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.
Jacobsen-Jelco
Conservancy District
Templeton, Linke & Associates
TOTKL

70%
20~

10 t

Ot
1 rc

r-

c {
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In its.answer to Interrogatory No. VI of the Special
Verdict. the jury also found that plaintiffs Jacobsen-Jelco
had assumed the risk of the damages complained of.

Tbe

jury reached a similar finding as to plaintiff Conservancy
District in the Answer to Interogatory No. VII.
In light of such findings, defendent Structo-Lite
moved the court to enter judgment of no cause of action in
its favor and against plaintiffs.

Said motion was denied

and judgment was then entered for plaintiffs, in accordance
with the percentages set out in the Special Verdict.
Defendant now takes this appeal from the entry of
that judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK IS STILL A COMPLETE
BAR TO A PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY IN A NEGLIGENCE
ACTION IN THIS JURISDICTION.
The primary issue herein concerns the present status
of the doctrine

kno~n

as

"assu~ption

of the risk."

The

trial jury was properly instructed regarding the doctrine
and thereafter returned an affirmative answer to the Special
Verdict Interrogatory asking whether plaintiff had assumed
the risk of the damages complained of.
Prior to the enactment of the Utah Comparative Negligence
Act, Section 78-27-37, ~~~h Code Ann. (1973), there is no
ouestion but ~hat the jurors' verdict would ~ave operated to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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totally bar any recovery by plaintiffs.

Defendant contends

that tbt aame result inures despite passage of the Comparative Negligence Act.

Yet defendant admits that the actual

wording of the Act is susceptible to several interpretations.
The statue itself reads:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery
in any action by any person or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence
or gross negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not as great as the negligence or gross
negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
As used in this Act, 'contributory negligence'
includes 'assu~ption of risk.'
Plaintiffs' alternative reading of the statute is that
the last sentence abolishes assumption of risk as a separate
defense and brings it within the
gence.

a~bit

Consequently, the factual

of

co~parative

co~ponents

negli-

of an assumption

of risk defense are now to be compared with other actions of
the parties to

deter~ine

what

perc~ntaqe

of fault such actions

comprise.
Defendant contends that such a reading of the statue
equates

assu~ption

of the risk with contributory negl1gence,

a conclusion not substantiated in the case law of this jurisdiction.

Assu~ptlon

of the r1sk and contr1butory negligence

have long been recognized in
separate defenses, and both

t~1s
~ay

be

-6-

jurisdict1on as distlnctly
sub~itted

to a jury if a
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sufficient evidentiary basis for the defenses is established.
Kuchenm~ister

v. Los Angeles •

s.

L. R. Co., 52 Dtah 111,

172 P. 725 (1918).
However, just as an accident can give rise to recovery
theories based upon negligence, warranty, and contract, ao aay
such accident have a factual basis to sustain the defenses
of both assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
thereby creating an area of overlapping defense.

It is this

last area referred to--where both defenses are applicable-that has created the confusion reqarding assumption of risk.
To understand how the defenses overlap, it is first
necessary to examine the distinctive characteristics of the
two defenses.

Dean William L. Prosser classifies the cases

dealing with assumption of risk into three broad basic types
of situations.
hand.

The third situation described is the case at

In it:
[T]he plaintiff, aware of a risk already created
by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds
voluntarily to encounter it--as where he has been
supplied with a chattel which he knows to be
unsafe and proceeds to use it after he has dis-.
covered the danger. If this is a voluntary ch~lce,
it mav be fo~nd that he has accepted the s1tua.1o~,
and c;nsented to relieve the defendant of his duty.

Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 440

(e~phasis

added I .
Assumption of risk, then, is a matter of kno10ledge of
the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it.

-7-

Contributory
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negligence, on the the other hand, is a matter of some fault
or departure from the standard of conduct of the reasonable
man, however unaware, unwilling, or even protesting the
plaintiff may be.

As is readily seen, there will be many

aituations where the two doctrines intersect or overlap.
Obviously the two may co-exist when the plaintiff
makes an unreasonable choice to incur the risk:
but either may exist without the other. The
significant difference, when there is one, is
likely to be one between risks which were in fact
known to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely
might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary
care.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra, at 441.
The distinction

bet~een

the

tw~

defenses, as delineated

by Professor Prosser, has long been established in this
jurisdiction.

As early as 1918, the Utah Supreme Court

noted the potentional overlaF of the defenses and the need
for distinguishing them in Kuchenrreister v. Los Anaeles &
S. L. R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918).

Citing with

approval the early English Common Law decision of Thomas v.
Quarterrr,ain, L.R. 18, Q.B. Div., the court wrote:
But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
risk, s~a~~s outside the de!e~se of
contributory negligence and is in no way limited
by it.
In indl\'idual instances, the t.,·o ideas
sometimes see!1' to cover the sa-e aro~e1d, but
[ass~~ed

ca~el~~s~eEs

lS

~:~

t~.e

~~-~

~nceles

S.

~~~~~

2£

1~:e:l1g~~~

choice.
Kuchenmeister v. Lcs

L.

R. Cc.,

~,

at 729

(italics omitted).
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Further on in that same opinion, the court stated1
It needs no argument, therefore, to demonstrate
that while in a particular ease facts may be
such as to justify a finding of both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, yet contributory
negligence does not necessarily arise from intelligent choice, and therefore is not necessarily
included in assumption of risk • • • •
Id.
The distinction continued.

In Clay v. Dunford, 121

Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1952) the court noted the
correctness of the converse of the proposition:

"Further-

more, plaintiffs' failure to exercise ordinary care to
discover the danger is not properly a matter of assumption
of risk, but of the defense of contributory negligence.•
Yet, however clear the distinction may appear to be
in light of the aforecited authorities, it has been consistently muddied in application.

Until the advent of

co~para-

tive negligence, both contributory negligence and assumption
of risk were complete bars to a plaintiff's recovery.

In

cases where both theories were applicable--the overlap area
previously referred to--the resultant outcomes would be
identical under either theory.

As such, there was no press-

ing need to distinguish between the theories.
the theories were often confused.
tiff to have

assu~ed

Predictably,

Some cases found a plain-

risk when he failed to use reasonable

care to discover the danger.

In others, a faulty assumption
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of risk defense still was found sufficient to comprise contributory negligence and therefore bar recovery.

In short,

one man's assumption of risk became another's contributory
negligence.

The results were, understandably, confused

and often times irreconcilable.
It is upon this backdrop that the Utah Legislature
authored the Utah Comparative Negligence Act.

Apparently

distraught with not only the injustices wrought by the contributory negligence doctrine, but also with the chameleonlike manner in which assumption of risk became contributory
negligence in many of the overlap cases, the Utah Legislature attempted to remedy the confusion.
enqendered

~ore

confusion.

By doing so, it

The question arose whether the

legislature intended to totally abolish assumption of risk
as a defense in this jurisdiction, or only to the extent
that it tracks the doctrine of contributory negligence.

If

the legislature indeed intended to abolish the doctrine
entirely, defendant contends that the word1ng of the statute
would be, "Contributory negliaence and assumption of risk
8hall not

~a~

reco~er~·

.

De!e~~a~t

feels

t~at

the

lumpina of assumption of risk with contributory negliaence

recognize the distinction between the doctrines and to only
pull that part of assumption of risk which truly equates
with contributory necligence into the a-bit and rule of
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comparative fault.

!!!

Becker v. Beaverton School District

No.4B, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976): Thompson v. Weaver, 560
P.2d 620 (Or. 1977), discussed infra.
Defendant readily admits that there is little evidence
as to whether the legislature even recognized the distinction between the doctrine of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk.

The statute itself is unclear and sus-

ceptible of either interpretation.

And in only one instance

since the passage of the Comparative Negligence Act has the
Utah Court directly dealt with this problem.
Strawberry

~ater

In Rigtrup v.

Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah

1977) the plaintiff-appellant Rigtrup contended on appeal
that the trial court had erred by instructing the jury as to
assumption of risk after it had adequately
contributory neglioence.

instr~cted

on

In affirming the trial court's

action, the Supreme Court stated:
Though there have been some differences in
view as to the defense of assumption of risk and
its relation to other aspects of contribJtory
negliqence, it has since time immemorial been
regarded as a valid defense in the law of this
state.
It has sometimes been said to be bJt a
soecialized asoect of contribJtory neglicence in
that it can be. intermingled and fused with other
aspects thereof in certain circumstances. It is
also s0~etirn.es said to be somethino separate from
contributory negligence, as 1t und~Jbtedly can be
in so;r,e c1rcur:1stances. Ho,.·ever, it requires but
little reflection to see that where there is a
known dancer, the risk of which is voluntarily
assumed
a party such action may well fall
within the lack of due care which constitutes

by
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neqligeoce and also mav be correctly termed an
assumpt1on ot r1s~. It such be the s1tuat1on,
the party should be charged with the responsib1~ity for his conduct by whatever term it may
be called; and the comparative negligence statute
quoted above should be applied as the trial court
correctly did in this case.

* * *
Reflection back upon the facts recited herein
will reveal that there was sufficient basis in
the evidence from which a jury could reasonably
believe that the plaintiffs were aware of a known
danger because of their inadequate wiring, and
that they voluntarily persisted in assuming the
risk of such an occurrence as did finally happen.
Consequently, the trial court was justified in
giving the instruction of assumption of risk.
Rigtrup v. Strawberry 'Vlater Users Association,

at

~·

1 25 0-51 •

The Rigtrup case clearly holds that assumption of risk
is still a viable defense in this jurisdiction.

The issue

then becomes whether the defense operates as a complete bar
to a plaintiff's recovery or whether its component elements
are to be weiahed in the computation of comparative fault,
alona with the component elements previously aiving rise to
a contributory nealigence defense.
opinion

su~aests

While some dicta in the

the latter as the rule, case holdings

suagest the former is correct.

assumption of risk instructions.

The

s~preme

Court held that

Those lnstructions, at-

tached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
this reference, estatlish

assu~~tion

cf risk as a

by

co~~lete
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bar to recovery in a negligence action where a plaintiff
voluntarily assumes the risk of a known danger.
This construction of the Utah Comparative Negligence
Act finds further support in Becker v. Beaverton School
District No.4B, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976).

In~.

the

Oregon Court of Appeals held that the Oregon Comparative
Negligence Statute did not bar the defense of assumption of
risk absolutely.

The Oregon and Utah Comparative Negligence

Statutes are substantially the same.

The court therein

stated:
We hold that the • • • comparative negligence statute . . . aFplied only to assumption of
the risk in its secondary sense. The wording of
the statute suggests this. As noted above, the
statute provided:
"Contributory negligence, includ1ng
assumption of the risk, shall not bar
recovery in an action • • • if such negligence contributing to the injury was not
as areat as the nealiaence of the oerson
against whom recovery- is sought • : •• •
ORS. 18.470 (1973).
The choice of the term "such negligence"
in the second clause of the statute required the
term "contributory negligence" or its equivalent
as an antecedent. Therefore, we conclude that the
~~r2~~ "i~:l~~i~a ass~~~tion of the risk'' ~as
~erely used as a-synonym for "contributory negliaence", the words immediately preceding the
phrase.
See, v. Schwartz, Cowcarative Necliaence,
160 §9.2,--(-1974).
Since the statute ala not apply
to assu~ption of the risk in its primary se~se ~nd
since defendant pleaded assumption of the r1sk 1n
that sense, it would not have been proper for the
trial court to give plaintiff's requested instructions on comparative negligence. Under ORS. 18.470
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(1973), assumption of the risk in its primary sense
remained a complete bar to a negligence action.
Becker v. Beaverton School Dist. No. 48, supra, at 502.
The reasoning of Becker applies just as readily in
Utah.

Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute differs from

the Oregon statute only in that the inclusion of assumption
of the risk within the term contributory negligence is
stated in a separate sentence rather than in a clause.
Otherwise the language is identical.
The Oregon statute has since been amended.

It now

flatly declares:
The doctrine of applied
risk is abolished.

assu~ption

of the

Or.Rev.Stat. S18.475(2).
As pointed out in Thompson v.

~eaver,

560 P.2d 620, 623

(Or. 1977), the new statute abolishes assumption of the risk
as a basis for barring recovery.
felled the doctrine in toto.
a~endment

The Oreaon Leaislature

Hov;ever, the passage of the

itself would seem to indicate that the legislature

recognized that the pre-amendment statute did not abolish
assu~ption

of risk

excep~

as it

O\'erla~~E~

c:~trit~tcr~·

negligence, in accord with the reasoning of Becker.

parative Negl1gence Statute are clearly analogous to the
case at hand.

The court in Riatruo recognized that an

instruction statina that

as8urr~tio~

of the risk in its
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proper sense, may still act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery is proper.

The reasoning of Becker suggeata

that Utah's Comparative Negligence Act is as reasonably
susceptible to differing interpretations as was Oregon's.
While a change in Utah law may, arguendo, be beneficial,
such change is to be brought about legislatively, as in the
Oregon situation, and not judicially.

This fact was prop-

erly recognized by the Rigtrup court.
{W)e decline the invitation to so change our law.
One of the important values in our system which
tends to produce confidence in and respect for
the law is that the law as it is declared and
known has sufficient solidarity and continuity
that it can be relied on with assurance. We
think that those objectives are best served by
the judicial branch refraining from legislating
any abrupt or drarr.atic changes of a substantial
nature in the law and by leaving any such changes
therein to the legislature, whose constltutional
prerogative it is.
Rigtrup v.

Kater Users Association, 563 P.2d

Stra~berry

1247, 1250 (Utah 1977).
Until the Utah legislature chooses to abolish the
defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar in a negligence action, it should be maintained and upheld by the
state trial courts.
cation of

The doctrine is not a confusing dupli-

contrib~tory

ne~ligence

where properly analyzed,

but is a distinctive legal concept.

As Prosser states:

~here the plaintiff acts unreasonably in
making his choice, it is said that their {sic)
is merely one form of contributory negligence
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which is certainly true: and from this it is
argued that there is, or should be no distinction
between the two defenses and that there is only
useless and confusing duplication. But this
is a distinctive kind of contributory negligence,
in which the plaintiff knows the risk and voluntarily accepts it: and it has been held to differ
from contributory negligence which merely fails
to discover the danger in several minor respects.
Thus assumption of risk is governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself, whereas
contributory negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable man.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) at 456.
POINT II
IF ASSUMPTION OF RISK REMAINS AS A
BAR TO AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE, IT
ALSO REMAINS AS A CO~PLETE BAR TO
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED IN K~RRA~TY.

The trial jury found defendant to have breached
its warranty (or contract) 1 to plaintiff and that such
breach was a proxirrate cause of the

da~ages

suffered by

plaintiff.
Inasmuch as the jurors also found that plaintiff
had assumed the risk of the damages complained of, it is
necessary to

deter~ine

whether

t~e

bar to recovery imposed

by the assumption of risk doctrine 1n a negligence action,
1

under the Uniform Com~ercial Code, sales by description
cf aoods are to be

treate~

as

ex~~e~~

~2rrarties

if

~ad~

part of tr.e ta.sis of the t·aroa1n·. Section /C.;-2-313, Uta~
Code Ann. (1965). The descriPtion need not be by words
Eut can be bv tE'c~nica~ SCE'c"f"ca:: ions as in tt'.e present
matter. As~ result, suit brouqht upon the contract for
failure to corrply with the contract spec1fications is
equivalent to a suit for breacr of exPress warranty, and
the

Ja~

r~:~~i~~

tc cases

c~

~x;~Ess

~~rra~tv

a;;:~~£.
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as discussed above, is equally applicable in an action based
on warr.anty,
A case law survey by two of the leading authorities in
the area of sales transactions finds that it is so applicable.

While jurisdictions are split as to whether con-

tributory negligence is a defense in a warranty cause of
action, the "courts are in unanimous agreement that the
egregious form of contributory negligence called 'assumption
of the risk' bars plaintiff's recovery in strict tort and in
warranty".
(1972)

White and Summers,

Unifor~

Commercial Code

at 336.

It is of more than passing interest that the authors of
the Restatement of Torts 2d also recognized the distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence and
felt the conceptual differences in the defenses to be great
enou~h,

and the doctrinal defense of assumption of risk

i~portant
co"~lete

eno~gh,

that they retained

bar and one of the

fe~

ass~~ption

of risk as a

defenses to a strict lia-

bility action, yet disallowed similar treatment for con-

Restatement of Torts 2d reads in pertinent part:
Cc~~rit~tory

of the plaintiff is not
such negligence consists merely
to discover the defect in the
auard aaainst the possibility of
-On the-other hand, the fonr. of

~e;!igence

a defense when
of the failure
product, or to
its existence.
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contributory negligence which consists in involuntarily and unreasonably proceeding to enc~nter a known danger, and commonly passes under
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under
this Section as in other cases of strict liability.
If the user or consumer discovers the defect and
is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
As the foregoing illustrates, not only has assumption
of risk historically been a complete defense to a warranty
action as well as a negligence action, but the leading
authorities in the field strongly feel that it should be

~

preserved, despite the abolition of the contributory negli-

\ gence defense.
POINT III
SINCE A PROPERLY INSTRUCTED TRIAL JURY
FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD ASSUMED THE RISK
OF THE DAMAGES COMPLAINED OF, DEFENDANT
WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT
AS A ~ATTER OF LAW AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO ENTER SUCH JUDG~ENT WAS ERROR.

The trial jury received proper instructions by the
court concerning the doctrine of assumption of risk.

As set

forth in the Statement of facts, Instruction No. 17 and
Instruction No. 18 make the proper distinction between true
assumption of risk cases in which the pla1ntiff has actual
knowledge of the

dan~er

and the quasi-contributory

ne~li-

gence sjtuation where the danger could have been recognized
through the use of ordinary care.
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It is true that the instructions do not state defendant's theory that assumption of risk, in the sense urged,
is a complete bar to recovery.

Such omission was intentional,

for apprising the jury of the effect of the finding that
plaintiff had assumed the risk of the damage would violate
the rule set down in McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529
P.2d 423 (Utah 1974)--that instructing a jury as to the effect
effect or impact that its fact-finding answers, in a Special
Verdict, "'ill have on the outcome of a corr.parative negligence
case is prejudicial error.
Under such instructions, the jury returned a Special
Verdict finding that plaintiff had indeed assumed the risk
of the damages complained of.
In light of such finding the defendant was entltled to
a judgment of no cause of action on the Verdict as a matter
of law.

The trial court's denial of

defe~dant's

motion for

such a Verdict was, therefore, in error.
COt\CLUSION
In light of the foregoing authorities, defendant,
~~~~etc-Lite

Encineering, Inc., rEspectfully re~~ests that

the verdict of the trial court in the herein matter be
reversed and that a judgment of no cause of action be
entered· for the defendant and against the plaintiffs.
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Reapectfully submitted this /

7~ay

of May, 1979.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

.

By

c·-. '-==·:....·_ _
H. James cfegg
"""
(

Attorneys for Defendant
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.
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